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WSARA One Year Later
William R. Fast
If the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA, enacted May 22, 2009) is to have any lasting effect, the behaviors of the defense acquisition workforce must change. One of my major concerns is how we can better train our major defense acquisition program (MDAP) managers and support staffs in the practical application of the tenets or principles of WSARA, most of which are really not new; they just mean getting back to the basics of 
acquisition! This article addresses three key challenges of WSARA and outlines some actions we 
need to take to change the culture of our acquisition workers. 
Integrated Cost and Schedule Estimation
First, we need to adopt an integrated team approach to cost and schedule estimation. For too long, we have left 
cost estimation to the cost estimators. To further aggravate the situation, we outsourced many of our government 
cost estimators in the 1990s and are paying the price today. In the past, we have expected the cost estimators 
alone to do the business of cost estimation, yet we never told them all they needed to know in order to prepare a 
realistic cost estimate.
Then once we got their cost estimate, we pressed them to reduce the estimate to a more “affordable” number. 
We also hoped for new manufacturing processes and economies of scale that might keep the program affordable 
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(for example, the Joint Strike Fighter). Sometimes, we 
even threw out the cost estimate altogether and simply 
funded to available budget. Such was the case with the 
Army’s Future Combat System when it entered develop-
ment at Milestone B in 2003. Not a good way to start a 
program! According to Gene Porter in a December 2009 
Institute for Defense Analyses paper entitled “The Major 
Causes of Cost Growth in Defense Acquisition,” when 
that occurs, the entire decision-making process is put 
at risk, including both the original analysis of alterna-
tives and the subsequent stability and executability of 
the program.
Cost and schedule estimation is a craft—a craft that 
requires reasoned inputs from systems engineers, lo-
gisticians, contracting officers, and testers, in addition 
to those of experienced cost estimators. It requires 
an integrated team of functional experts dedicated to 
identifying risk and assigning cost and schedule to that 
risk. Cost and schedule estimates cannot be done in a 
vacuum by a single estimator. It’s a team sport in which 
multi-functional inputs are essential for success.
WSARA created the position of director of cost assess-
ment and program evaluation in 2009. In addition to 
reviewing all component cost estimates and conducting 
an independent cost estimate for MDAPs, the director 
of cost assessment and program evaluation is to pro-
vide policies and procedures for all DoD cost estimates. 
That’s a tall order, and one that can be achieved only if 
the grassroots acquisition workers make integrated cost 
and schedule estimation part of their day-to-day routine. 
That’s because no policy or procedure can ever be writ-
ten that will turn over all the technical and programmatic 
“rocks” under which cost and schedule risks lie in wait-
ing. Our systems are just too complex. And even if it 
could be written, no policy or procedure has ever seen 
100 percent compliance.
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WSARA also requires the disclosure of the confidence lev-
els for baseline estimates for MDAPs. Justification must be 
provided if the cost estimate is calculated at a confidence 
level less than 80 percent. Now, the law doesn’t specify how 
confidence levels are calculated or explain why 80 percent 
is the target, as opposed to 90 percent or 70 percent. The 
intent of the law is to hedge against cost overruns.
Wouldn’t we serve the same purpose if we used integrated 
cost and schedule estimation to uncover technical and pro-
grammatic risks and covered those risks at the beginning of 
the program to create more realistic cost and schedule esti-
mates? Wouldn’t risk-informed cost and schedule estimates 
be more easily defended through the budgeting process and 
to Congress? 
The solution, from where I sit, is to teach and model inte-
grated cost and schedule estimating to the grassroots ac-
quisition workers. We have totally revamped our training for 
cost estimators and put them into their own career track, and 
we must not stop integrating cost and schedule estimation in 
our other acquisition courses. In addition, risk identification 
and management should become part of the curriculum so 
the acquisition worker can discover technical and program-
matic risks and adjust cost and schedule estimates to miti-
gate them. I’ll come back to that point later.
Competitive Prototyping
Let’s talk about the “art” of competitive prototyping. I call 
prototyping an art because it is part of a program’s acqui-
sition strategy. From my experience, acquisition strategy 
development is more of an art than a prescriptive science. 
I also know from teaching in the DAU PMT 352 program 
management office course that competitive prototyping is 
not well understood. In that course, students have to lay out 
a strategy for competitive prototyping prior to Milestone B. 
My experience is that we get all kinds of approaches, many 
of which reveal that students don’t understand exactly what 
a developmental prototype is and how competitive prototyp-
ing might be used in the technology development phase prior 
to Milestone B. 
For MDAPs, WSARA mandated competitive prototyping of 
systems or critical subsystems before Milestone B approval, 
unless waived by the milestone decision authority. Moreover, 
If the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 
is to have any lasting effect, the behaviors of the 
defense acquisition workforce must change.
even if competitive prototyping is waived, a prototype must 
be produced before Milestone B. 
Competitive prototyping isn’t new to the Department of De-
fense. Even before WSARA, John Young, then-under sec-
retary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, 
made it policy to have multiple competitive prototypes in 
order to determine the maturity of the technology and get 
a better cost estimate prior to Milestone B. Today, the Joint 
Air-Ground Missile, Joint Lightweight Tactical Vehicle, and 
Small Diameter Bomb II are examples of programs that seem 
to be using competitive prototyping with some success.
Yet there are also the failures—not failures in the sense of 
program failure, but failures in the sense that competitive pro-
totyping really does not appear to have been cost-effective. 
Porter argues that the cost of developmental prototypes for 
the Joint Strike Fighter and Littoral Combat Ship only added 
to cost growth and may not have been worth the effort. 
The concept of competitive prototyping is, indeed, new to 
many of today’s acquisition workers because its use has 
been cyclical. The idea of prototyping aircraft engine and 
airframe combinations can be traced back some 20 years 
before World War II and was fairly common into the 1950s. 
A “fly-before-buy” strategy was instituted in the late 1960s 
by David Packard, then-deputy secretary of defense, but it 
fell out of favor by the late 1970s. Once again, the 1986 Pack-
ard Commission Report emphasized prototyping before full-
scale development and this became part of DoD Instruction 
5000.2 in 1987. However, both Porter and Jeffrey A. Drezner, 
author of a 1992 Rand Corporation research report, “The 
Nature and Role of Prototyping in Weapon System Develop-
ment,” point out that the nature of prototyping, the condi-
tions under which one should prototype, and the benefits of 
prototyping remain unidentified. 
Today’s acquisition workers need to rethink and relearn 
competitive prototyping. They need to be trained on how to 
make a sound business case for competitive prototyping—if 
one actually exists. They need to think through how they will 
manage two or more contractors in a competition-sensitive 
environment. And—back to the cost estimating that I dis-
cussed earlier—they need to know how to convince decision 
makers in the programming and budgeting processes that 
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the additional cost of multiple prototypes is worth the fund-
ing. In addition, they need to understand advanced technology 
demonstrations and joint capability technology demonstra-
tions that have long been in the domain of the science and 
technology community but should now be considered as viable 
prototyping approaches in the technology development phase. 
Even more difficult for acquisition students to understand is 
how to compete at the critical subsystem level, as is permitted 
by WSARA. Full-up system prototypes are clearly impractical 
for big developments such as aircraft carriers and for one-of-
a-kind satellites. Acquisition workers not only need to under-
stand how to down-select from competing subsystem-level 
prototypes, but they also need to understand the on-ramp 
processes by which these winning components are integrated 
back into the larger system.
I advocate that case studies, written around programs that 
have used competitive prototypes (whether successful or un-
successful) be injected into DAU program management certi-
fication courses. In addition, the PMT 352 program manage-
ment office course should include a seminar on competitive 
prototyping just prior to the exercise in which students develop 
an acquisition strategy around competitive prototyping. 
Systems Engineering Decisions
Now let me turn to the third challenge of asking the right 
questions and making the tough systems engineering de-
cisions, especially during preliminary and critical design 
reviews. As a quick review, the preliminary design review 
defines the allocated baseline for the weapon system, and 
according to WSARA, the preliminary design review (PDR) 
for MDAPs must come before the Milestone B decision re-
view. Similarly, the critical design review defines the product 
baseline for the system and now separates the two major 
efforts of the engineering and manufacturing development 
phase: (1) integrated system design; and (2) systems ca-
pability and manufacturing process demonstration. Prior to 
WSARA, DoD Instruction 5000.02 raised the importance of 
these reviews by requiring post-PDR and post-critical design 
review assessments by the milestone decision authority, with 
decisions from those assessments documented in acquisition 
decision memoranda. 
During the technology development phase, WSARA and 
DoD Instruction 5000.02 require that MDAPs conduct a 
system-level PDR: “A successful PDR will inform require-
ments trades; improve cost estimation; and identifies re-
maining design, integration, and manufacturing risks.” The 
cost-performance trades that result from knowledge gained 
during competitive prototyping can help keep the program 
affordable and within the Milestone A component cost es-
timate. But are we teaching our acquisition workers what 
questions to ask at the PDR about design, integration and 
manufacturing risks? More important, are we really train-
ing them to make the tough decisions regarding cost and 
performance trades? 
According to DoD Instruction 5000.02, “The project shall 
exit the technology development phase when an affordable 
program or increment of militarily useful capability has been 
identified; the technology and manufacturing processes for 
that program or increment have been assessed and demon-
strated in a relevant environment; manufacturing risks have 
been identified; a system or increment can be developed for 
production in a short timeframe (normally less than five years 
for weapon systems); or, when the MDA decides to terminate 
the effort.” That’s a lot to ask! Are we really training the people 
who staff our pre-MDAP program offices to make those as-
sessments and recommendations?
Too often in the past, programs have entered the engineering 
and manufacturing development phase without having dem-
onstrated required technologies in a relevant environment, 
which is defined as technology readiness level (TRL) 6. In 
last year’s class of Nunn-McCurdy-breaching programs, root 
cause analyses identified several bad actors. Porter reports 
that when the Army’s Future Combat System entered system 
development and demonstration in 2003, 24 out of 31 of the 
identified critical technologies were at TRLs below 6. None 
of the 20 critical technologies was at TRL 6 when the Joint 
Tactical Radio Systems–Ground Mobile Radio entered system 
development and demonstration in 2002. The War-fighter 
Information Network–Tactical had only three of 12 critical tech-
nologies at TRL 6 when it entered systems development and 
demonstration in 2003 (Porter, p. 44).
WSARA now requires the director of defense research and 
engineering to conduct an independent assessment of the 
technological maturity and integration risk of the critical 
technologies of MDAPs. In addition, the DDRE is to develop 
knowledge-based standards to measure the technological ma-
turity and integration risk of critical technologies at key stages 
in the acquisition process. In the past, the program manager 
was responsible for technology readiness assessments that 
were based upon definitions provided in the Defense Acquisi-
tion Guidebook. 
Inadequacies in initial system design, systems engineering, 
and risk assessment at the front end of the program continue 
to translate into poor cost and schedule estimates (Porter, p. 
45-46). We continue to shortchange early system engineering 
efforts in that critical timeframe between identification of the 
capability gap and Milestone B. In past acquisition workforce 
downsizing efforts, we got rid of key government engineers 
who shepherded the transition of new technologies into ac-
quisition programs, so now we have lost their knowledge of 
how to assess technology readiness and manage technology 
transition risks.
We also do a poor job of estimating systemic risks inherent in 
the total system design. As we link systems to other systems, 
government program management office personnel need to 
better understand the integration and interoperability chal-
lenges. Case in point: We don’t again want to get into a posi-
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tion where we have to hire 
a lead systems integrator, 
as was the case with the 
Army’s Future Combat 
System. 
We need to teach our 
acquisition workers how 
early systems engineer-
ing design reviews can 
identify risks. We need to 
help them understand the 
risks associated with the 
integration of systems of 
systems. We need to lead 
them through case stud-
ies that demonstrate the 
value of early systems 
engineering and teach 
them some of the basic 
questions that need to 
be asked. We also need 
to train our people in the 
early decisions that must 
be made regarding which 
technologies are ready 
for the first increment of 
development and which 
technologies need to be 
deferred to later incre-
ments of capability. 
We need to emphasize 
early systems engineering 
in our on-line fundamental 
and intermediate systems 
acquisition management 
courses. We also need to 
integrate more risk man-
agement training in all our 
acquisition courses. Cur-
rently, risk management is 
taught only as a targeted 
training event at the re-
quest of a program office or acquisition command. Much 
can be done to make our risk instruction more robust and to 
link it more clearly to early systems engineering. 
Institutionalizing WSARA
What will it take to really institutionalize WSARA? I feel 
strongly that changing the culture of the acquisition work-
force requires that we change the way we teach and model 
the acquisition process. I’ve discussed three acquisition chal-
lenges to begin with as we seek to change behaviors and get 
back to basics. First, we need an integrated team approach to 
estimating cost and schedule. Cost and schedule estimation 
are not the responsibility of the cost estimator alone. Second, 
Arnie, whose program held the 2010 record for cost overruns, is inducted into the
Acquisition Hall of Shame.
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we must teach the art of competitive prototyping; we must 
rethink and relearn from the past and define the nature of 
prototyping, under what conditions one should prototype, 
and the benefits of prototyping. And third, we must help 
our acquisition workers ask the right questions and make 
the tough systems engineering decisions, especially during 
preliminary and critical design reviews. Those actions will 
go a long way in helping us understand programmatic and 
technical risks earlier.
Fast teaches acquisition and program management courses at the Naval 
Postgraduate School. Prior to that, he taught in the program management 
office course at DAU. The author welcomes comments and questions and 
can be contacted at wrfast@nps.edu.
